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CLERGY ARBITRATOR
LIABILITY: A
POTENTIAL PITFALL
OF ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE CHURCH
LEE TARTE*
INTRODUCTION
In the Bible, the Apostle Paul exhorts Christians to choose from
among their number a "wise man" who can "judge" and "decide between
his brethren."' Following this exhortation, and bolstered by recent secu-
lar interest in alternative dispute resolution (ADR),2 a number of Chris-
tian organizations have begun to develop dispute resolution mechanisms
to resolve conflicts within the Church.
While many Christians welcome the movement, it comes at a time
when an unprecedented fear of liability haunts the clergy. The fears,
spawned by a limited number of clergy malpractice suits and the recent
emergence of clergy malpractice insurance,' may inhibit the development
* Clerk to Judge James C. Hill, United States 11th Circuit Court of Appeals. B.A. 1984,
Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1987, Harvard University.
I Corinthians 6:1-7 (New American Standard Version).
2 The secular interest in ADR has been widely attested. Owen Fiss, a critic of the move-
ment, acknowledges that ADR is the "source of a new movement in the law. This movement
is the subject of a new professional journal, a newly formed section of the American Associa-
tion of Law Schools, and several well-funded institutes. It has even received its own acro-
nym, ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution)." Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073,
1073 (1984).
' See Note, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malprac-
tice Concept, 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 507, 508-09 (1983)(a single insurance company began offer-
ing clergy malpractice insurance in 1979).
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of what this paper will term "Christian ADR.'"
While the Christian ADR methods employed thus far have taken
many forms of alternate dispute resolution, this paper will focus on arbi-
tration in the Christian Church. Arbitration provides a particularly inter-
esting backdrop for a discussion of clergy liability, since, unlike in media-
tor liability situations, a fairly well-developed set of rules defines arbitral
liability. Furthermore, arbitration provides an ideal context for examining
the interface between traditional liability doctrines and the first amend-
ment; since the directives in the Biblical passage mentioned above most
closely correlate to an arbitral dispute resolution process, the religous
mandate to arbitrate is more readily apparent.
As the move to revitalize the use of ADR in the church gains momen-
tum, questions concerning the liability of those who actually arbitrate dis-
putes among Church members will become increasingly important. First,
the possibility of a high standard of liability may result in a chilling effect
on the development of ADR in religous disputes. Secondly, the issue of
liability will implicate the free exercise of rights of both the participants
in the arbitration and the arbitrators. Thirdly, the State or members of
the legal community may argue that the State must prevent the erection
of what, it will claim, amounts to a parallel judicial system. Clerics and
churches must be prepared to meet these arguments.
To demonstrate the types of problems which might arise in situations
where clerics assume arbitral functions, I offer five hypothetical situations
in which a disgruntled church member might call upon the courts to hold
a religious arbitrator liable. These situations would strongly test the
courts' commitment to granting church arbitrators immunity from liabil-
ity. I do not purport to resolve these problems; I simply offer them to
enrich the factual and contextual background of the liability discussion.
(1) In its articles of membership, a church includes a provision
whereby those agreeing to become members also agree to allow the pas-
tor 5 to arbitrate disputes that may arise between members. A cleric of the
church resolves a dispute between two church members, ruling in favor of
one party at the other's expense. The less successful party leaves the
church and files suit against the pastor, claiming that the pastor fraudu-
lently induced her to join the church, and thus her earlier promise to
This term will be used to denote the range of practices carried out by members of a
church who bear authority from that church to resolve a dispute among its members. For
lack of more precise terminology, this article often will refer to "clergy arbitrators," by
which it will mean all those members of a church, whether or not officially ordained or paid
by the church, who act in an authorized capacity in resolving disputes through Christian
ADR.
' In this paper, "pastor" will frequently be used as shorthand to designate pastors, priests,
elders, or other religious leaders or governing bodies.
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arbitrate ought to be held invalid.
(2) After several months, the member of the clergy assigned to re-
solve a particular dispute has yet to render a decision. Both parties file
Suit against the would-be arbitrator. The "arbitrator" claims that she was
unable to make a decision because she was waiting for an influx of the
Holy Spirit to guide her decision, and the influx never came. Alterna-
tively, the arbitrator claims that she was unable to render a decision be-
cause God or the Holy Spirit was against it.
(3) During the arbitration proceedings, the arbitrator refuses to listen
to one side, explaining that she has already received a spiritual revelation
that the other side must win.
(4) A church teaches that one racial group is inferior to another. The
result of an arbitration strongly favors a member of the group which the
church has declared to be racially superior. The losing party sues the ar-
bitrator in civil court. Alternatively, the church asserts no such doctrine,
but the pastor makes his decision based on what he claims is divinely-
inspired racism.
(5) A church teaches that mothers serve as divinely ordained caretak-
ers for their children. An examination of a number of decisions made by
the church's arbitrators in divorce custody cases reveals that the church
has never awarded the children to the father. A group of fathers wishes to
file a class action against the church and its arbitrators.
In this Article I will analyze the ability of courts to impose liability
on arbitrators in situations such as those hypothesized in these five cases.
In the first part of this Article, I will discuss some first amendment con-
siderations which are unique to Christian arbitration and which bolster
the argument for immunity for clerical arbitrators. In the second section
of this Article, I will explore the present status of arbitral liability, in-
cluding the increasing array of exceptions to the general doctrine that
arbitrators may not be held liable for the performance of their arbitral
duties. In general, I conclude that, in the context of clergy arbitration,
arbitral immunity must be strengthened in order to protect the free exer-
cise guaranteed to religous leaders and their churches.
PART ONE: FIRST AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS
Pursuant to a general policy based on the first amendment free exer-
cise doctrine, courts generally recognize decisions by church hierarchies.
Where the matter decided by the church court is purely ecclesiastical,
courts absolutely refuse to review the decision out of concern that such a
review might require an inquiry into matters of religous doctrine. It is
asserted that holding clergy arbitrators liable for their arbitral functions
would violate this general policy and would force an impermissible in-
quiry into religous doctrine. Moreover, since courts disallow any regula-
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tion of religious thought and permit interference with religious conduct
only under compelling circumstances, this chapter will suggest that im-
posing liability upon arbitrators would allow the courts a constitutionally
unacceptable oversight of religious beliefs and conduct.
A. The Free Exercise Policy That Church Hierarchies Be Allowed to
Decide Their Own Disputes
The Supreme Court has declared a general policy in favor of honor-
ing ecclesiastical decisions.' Although the Court, in dictum, has stated
that it would permit review of these decisions only in instances of fraud
or collusion, 7 it is quite solicitous of decisions by religious tribunals.
While heretofore the Court has specifically deferred to decisions by reli-
gious tribunals only on ecclesiastical matters, the arguments presented by
the Court to justify honoring the decisions expand the potential scope of
the solicitation far beyond the initial definition of "ecclesiastical" issues,
and should clearly protect the individual rendering an arbitral decision in
a religous setting.
1. The Policy Respecting Ecclesiastical Affairs
The Supreme Court has explained that the first amendment mandates
that courts respect decisions on ecclesiastical matters made by church
hierarchies:
All who unite themselves to [a religous] body do so with an implied
consent to this government, and are.bound to submit to it. But it would be
a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religous bod-
ies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular
courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religous unions,
and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising
among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of
ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself
provides for.'
The Court has offered three rationales to support this general policy
of permitting the decisional autonomy of church courts. First, as in the
quote above, the Court has pointed to the free exercise clause and the
restrictions that clause places upon governmental supervision of religious
activities.' In decision-making, as in other religious activities, believers
are protected in their ability to exercise their religion freely. Secondly,
the Court has maintained that churches are more qualified than courts to
' See Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
Id.
8 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871).
8 Id. at 728-29.
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resolve church disputes: "It is not to be supposed that the judges of the
civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religous faith
of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their
own.'"10 Thirdly, the Court has acknowledged that interference in church
disputes might inhibit the development of religious doctrine:
First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property liti-
gation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over
religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such con-
troversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever
present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and impli-
cating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern."
2. The Limited Review of Church Decisions
The Supreme Court, in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Ma-
nila,12 initially recognized the judicial power to review church decisions,
noting that decisions of church tribunals, "in the absence of fraud, collu-
sion, or arbitrariness," must be accepted by the secular courts. 3 Since the
Gonzalez case, the Court has narrowed the scope of its reviewing powers.
Pointing out that the Gonzalez rule was dictum, and that "no decision of
this Court has given concrete content to or applied the 'exception,' " the
Court concluded:
[W]hether or not there is room for "marginal civil court review" under the
narrow rubrics of "fraud" or "collusion" when church tribunals act in bad
faith for secular purposes, no "arbitrariness" exception-in the sense of an
inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hier-
archical church complied with church laws and regulations-is consistent
with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the
decisions of the highest judicatories of a religous organization of hierarchical
polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law.' 4
The Court's careful solicitation of a church's right to make a binding
decision is significant for two reasons: first, it reveals a. general policy to
allow churches to make their own decisions whenever the courts may al-
low them to do so; and second, it indicates that courts should be even
more cautious in holding clergy arbitrators liable, for assessing individual
I d. at 729.
" Presbyterian Church In the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
Is 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1926).
13 Id.
" Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese For the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 712-13 (1976).
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liability for a religious choice seems even more constitutionally questiona-
ble than interfering with the decision made.
3. The Extension of the Rationale
The Supreme Court has held that the first amendment prohibition of ju-
dicial interference with ecclesiastical decisions applies to disputes over
church property, church polity, and church administration. 5 The Court's
specific listing of relevant dispute areas might suggest that the degree of
solicitude would not be invoked where ecclesiastical courts render deci-
sions in other areas.
However, the definition of what constitutes an "ecclesiastical" matter
on which a church hierarchy's decision will be protected is vague, espe-
cially in the context of disputes in the Christian Church. The Bible com-
mands Christians to take any "case against [a] neighbor" to the "law
courts" of the Church. 6 Given the breadth of that mandate, it would be
difficult to make a legal argument that clerical arbitrators do not decide
"ecclesiastical" matters.17
Moreover, the rationales which the Court offers for its protection of
ecclesiastical decisions"8 are broad enough to cover situations in which
plaintiffs seek to hold clergy arbitrators liable. Applying the Court's first
rationale in the church-based arbitration area, an attempt to hold clerics
liable for fraud or collusion would inevitably force review of ecclesiastical
principles, in violation of the free exercise clause. In order to assess liabil-
ity when clerics claim that they act in obedience to a command in the
Bible, and according to "wisdom" they have received from God and the
Bible, courts would have to ask whether the cleric's instructions from God
were correct. But an inquiry into the truth of religious beliefs is constitu-
tionally forbidden; at most courts may ascertain whether the clergy arbi-
trator actually believed that he or she had received these revelations.' 9
At first glance, the second rationale undergirding the policy of honor-
'5 Id. at 710.
I Corinthians 6:1-2 (New American Standard).
1 Clerics will undoubtedly claim that they arbitrate by mandate of the Bible and in accor-
dance with the qualifications and wisdom given them by God. Consequently a clergy arbitral
liability case will not be the same case as United Methodist Church v. California Superior
Court, 439 U.S. 1369 (1978). In that case, Justice Rehnquist denied an application to stay
proceedings against a church. Noting that the action was based on breach of contract and
statutory violations resulting from the church's activity in running a retirement home, Jus-
tice Rehnquist suggested that entanglement and free exercise considerations were irrelevant
to what all parties agreed were "purely secular disputes." Id. at 1373. The stay was sought
from an order given in Barr v. United Methodist Church, 90 Cal. App. 3d 259, 153 Cal. Rptr.
332, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 973 (1979).
" See supra text accompanying notes 8-11.
" See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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ing ecclesiastical courts' decisions seems less apt. Clerical arbitrators may
not have as much expertise in deciding cases among church members as
the courts deciding ecclesiastical cases have imputed to them. However,
given the motives behind a return to ecclesiastical decision-making, espe-
cially the desire to reinsert religious principles into dispute resolution,20
clerical arbitrators decidely will have a level of expertise surpassing that
of the civil courts in applying the ecclesiatical laws and principles accept-
able to that church community.2 1
Similarly, the third rationale provided by the Supreme Court applies
in the church arbitration setting. Holding clerical arbitrators liable would
act as a penalty on individuals and churches enacting what they believe
to be a religiously-mandated command. This penalty could in turn pro-
duce a chilling effect on the exercise of a belief in church-based arbitra-
tion, an effect which would be particularly profound given the concept of
church tribunals is in the early phases of revival. The analysis of whether
one ought, on religious grounds, to engage in church-based ADR might be
clouded by fears of liability.
Thus, the rationales supporting the Supreme Court's general prefer-
ence for allowing church court decisions to stand would similarly favor a
policy shielding church arbitrators from liablity. Consequently, the courts
should be solicitous of church arbitrators and their decisions.
B. The Limitations on Review of Ecclesiastical Matters Would Pre-
clude Courts from Imposing Liability on Clergy Arbitrators
In addition to setting forth a general policy favoring ecclesiastical
resolution of ecclesiastical disputes, the Supreme Court has absolutely
prohibited courts from making any decisions which require an inquiry
into church doctrines. For example, courts may determine ownership of
church property only where the determination will not force them inside
the boundaries of church doctrine. In this chapter, I will argue that trying
the liability of clerical arbitrators would inevitably force courts inside the
forbidden doctrinal arena.
1. When Courts May Permissibly Make Decisions Regarding Church
Matters
According to the Supreme Court, the first amendment forbids courts
to look at "the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the im-
portance of those doctrines to the religion."22 The prohibition against in-
20 See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.
"' See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
2 Presbyterian Church In the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presby-
terian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1968). A court may constitutionally examine religious doc-
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vestigating doctrinal matters is absolute, but courts may make determina-
tions about church matters using "any one of various approaches.., so
long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the rit-
ual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith."" For example, "[a]t
least in general outline," courts may permissibly apply neutral principles
of law to church disputes, so long as those principles steer clear of doctri-
nal issues.24
2. The Clash Between Permissible Review and Trying the Liability of
Clergy Arbitrators.
Courts will be unable to avoid examining doctrinal matters if they
attempt to hold clerical arbitrators liable, and thus will have no constitu-
tional manner in which to assess liability for church arbitrators. Un-
doubtedly, clerics will make three claims when faced with the prospect of
liability for arbitral acts. Examining any of these claims would force
courts into the position of reviewing church doctrine.
First, the clerical arbitrators are likely to argue that they used reli-
gious principles and guidance in order to reach a decision. In order to
evaluate this claim, courts would have to consider the principles and
guidance which the arbitrator claimed to have received.
Secondly, the clerics will probably claim a contractual right to govern
those who have submitted to the church's authority by becoming mem-
bers. This assertion will be based on the Supreme Court's statement that
"[aill who unite themselves to [a religious] body do so with an implied
consent to [its] government, and are bound to submit to it,"", and on the
uments, but "[i]f in such a case the interpretation of the [documents] would require the civil
court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the
doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body." Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604
(1979); see also Serbian Orthodox Diocese For the United States v. Milivo Jevich, 426 U.S.
696, 723 (1976) (Court could not examine church constitutional provisions where the provi-
sions "were not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a
searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity"); cf. Maryland & Va. El-
dership of the Churches of God v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 367 (1970) (Maryland
court's decision "involved no inquiry into religious doctrine" although the court had looked
at "provisions in the constitution of the General Eldership pertinent to the ownership and
control of the church property").
23 Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (quoting Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)).
2 See id.
2 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 729 (1871). The applicability of this statement to the
church arbitration context is bourne out by a number of cases in which courts have refused
to hold churches and pastors liable for disciplining church members. In each of these cases,
the court argued that the church member had agreed to accept the discipline by accepting
the benefits of church membership. Rosicrucian Fellowship v. Rosicrucian Fellowship Non-
sectarian Church, 39 Cal. 2d 121, 245 P.2d 481, 487-88 (1952) (en banc) ("[a] person who
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ground that courts generally honor contractual agreements between
churches and their members which reverse normal presumptions of civil
law. For example, in a property dispute case, the Supreme Court stated
that "[tihe neutral-principles approach cannot be said to 'inhibit' the free
exercise of religion.""6 The Court noted specifically that "[a]t any time
before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure" the result not indicated
under state law, while "the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the
result indicated by the parties provided it is embodied in some legally
cognizable form."" Again, assessing these claims would require courts to
delve into church dogma concerning who qualifies as a member and what
each church member agrees to by joining the church.
Finally, clergy members will claim that they have a Biblical mandate
to make arbitral decisions."8 If courts attempt to evaluate this assertion,
they will have to examine the Biblical texts referred to and interpret
those texts to support or contradict the clerics.
Essentially, then, clergy arbitrators probably will claim that every ar-
bitral decision which they render concerns an ecclesiastical issue, and in
order to disprove the clerics, courts will have to examine religious doc-
trine. However, because such a doctrinal review is constitutionally prohib-
ited,29 courts simply may not hold clerics liable for arbitrations performed
for religious reasons, particularly if those arbitrations are on behalf of
members of the clerics' churches. In fact, in Baumgartner v. First Church
of Christ,30 an Illinois appellate court recognized that first amendment
considerations may obviate the court's ability to set a standard by which
to hold clerics liable: "adjudication of the present case would require the
court to extensively investigate and evaluate religious tenets and doc-
trines: first, to establish the standard of care of an 'ordinary' Christian
Science practitioner; and second, to determine whether [the faith healers]
deviated from those standards."'" As a result, said the court, it simply
could not hold the faith healer liable on any sort of malpractice theory.
joins a church covenants expressly or impliedly that in consideration of the benefits which
result from such a union he will submit to its control and be governed by its laws, usages
and customs whether they are of an ecclesiastical or temporal character as to which laws,
usages, and customs he assents as to so many stipulations of a contract"), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 938 (1953); see, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544, 559 (Mo. App. 1987) ("It may
be that the statements from the pulpit ... were a form of chastening usual as to wayward
members and conformable to the liturgy, discipline and ecclesiastical policy of the church
and congregation. If so, and if the Hesters were members of that religious body, they pre-
sumptively consented to religiously motivated discipline practiced in good faith").
26 Jones, 443 U.S. at 606.
27 Id.
28 See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
"9 See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
"0 141 Ill. App. 3d 898, 490 N.E.2d 1319, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915 (1986).
" Id. at 902, 490 N.E.2d at 1324.
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The Baumgartner court recognized that it faced the same dilemma if
it tried to hold the cleric liable on a theory of negligence or intentional
disregard:
To set forth a cause of action sounding in negligence, a plaintiff must allege
the existence of a duty of reasonable care owed plaintiff by defendant,
breach of that duty and injury proximately resulting from the breach....
For the court to determine whether defendants breached any duty owed to
decedent would require a searching inquiry into Christian Science beliefs
and the validity of such beliefs. As established above, such an inquiry is
precluded by the first amendment.32
Furthermore, the court maintained these constitutional pitfalls could not
be overcome by "merely conclusionary" allegations of coercion and intim-
idation.3 3 Consequently, the case was simply not actionable.
C. Clergy Arbitrator Liability as an Impermissible Regulation of Reli-
gious Conduct
Even assuming that courts were freely permitted to review church
decisions, and that probing the decisions did not require any search into
church doctrine, holding clerics liable for arbitrating would nevertheless
involve the court in a constitutionally forbidden regulation of religious
beliefs and conduct. Governmental bodies may not inquire into religious
beliefs, and may examine religious conduct only when they demonstrate a
compelling need to do so. Thus, even where the arbitration is deemed
conduct rather than belief, the courts will not be able to offer a compel-
ling state need to regulate it.
Finally, where governmental bodies demonstrate that a compelling
state need justifies an infringement on a first amendment right, they
must also establish that the infringement is being carried out in the least
intrusive manner possible. Such a demonstration will not be possible in
the clergy arbitral liability context, since the least intrusive means of ac-
complishing any state need would be to invalidate the cleric's judgment
rather than to hold the cleric personally liable for his or her mistake.
1. Liability as a Government Probe into Religious Beliefs
The Constitution absolutely protects religious beliefs. For example,
in U.S. v. Ballard,34 the Supreme Court determined that the lower court
could not ask whether the accused's beliefs, which he disseminated in the
2 Id. at 907-08, 490 N.E.2d at 1325 (faith healer held not liable for decedent's death despite
accusations that faith healer failed to heal decedent and persuaded decedent not to seek
help which might have been more successful).
" Id. at 908, 490 N.E.2d at 1326.
3- 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
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mail, were correct.3 5 The only constitutional inquiry, opined the Court,
was whether or not the defendant believed what he claimed to believe:
Men may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof
of their religious doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real
as life to some may be incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they
may be beyond the ken of mortals does not mean that they can be made
suspect before the law.36
In Ballard, the United States clearly had an interest in preventing
mail fraud, just as the states have an interest in preventing arbitral fraud.
Yet the Court protected Ballard's beliefs from judicial probing, as the
courts ought to protect the beliefs of church-based arbitrators. Although
this protection will not be implicated in every circumstance of potential
clergy arbitral liability, its safeguards will be invoked whenever the only
claim against the cleric is that he or she produced an incorrect decision
(rather than used a flawed process by which to obtain that decision), and
where the cleric's response to that claim is that a religious belief
prompted that particular decision.3 7 In such a case, the only inquiry left
available to the court is whether or not the cleric believed that the deci-
sion was correct, and not whether the decision was indeed correct.
2. An Impermissible Regulation of Religiously-Dictated Conduct
Where religiously-prompted acts, as opposed to beliefs, confront a
governmental body, the body has some power to regulate the conduct.
Congress, for example, "was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order."3 " Similarly, other governmental
groups may exert some regulatory power over religious actions:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot inter-
" Id. at 86-88.
36 Id. at 86-87.
37 At the very least, the belief/act distinction is murky in the clergy arbitral liability situa-
tion, since the ability of the Christian community to exist as a separate and judicially auton-
omous entity is threatened. Uncertainty should be resolved in favor of the first amendment
right. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In that case the Court, asserting that "in
this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments," found
a law mandating that parents send their children to high school unconstitutional as applied
to the Amish, who believe their social structure and possibly their religion would be de-
stroyed by the law's requirement. Id. at 220. The Court explained its decision by noting that
"the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their faith [and] is shown
by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction from
the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, 'be not conformed to this world .... '" Id. at 216. The
Christian ADR movement also stems from an injunction set forth by Paul. See supra note 1.
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
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fere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Sup-
pose one believed that human sacrifices were a necessary part of religious
worship, would it be seriously contended that the civil government under
which he lived could not interfere to prevent a sacrifice? Or if a wife relig-
iously believed it was her duty to burn herself upon the funeral pile of her
dead husband, would it be beyond the power of the civil government to
prevent her carrying her belief into practice? 9
a. The "Threat to Public Order" Exception
The Supreme Court has limited governmental regulation of religious
activity to circumstances where it is deemed that the public order will be
threatened unless the regulation is upheld. For example, in Reynolds v.
United States,0 the court upheld a law banning polygamy, basing its de-
cision on the ground that polygamy fell within the parameters of an activ-
ity which threatened the public order. 41 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
noted that "[t]he conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed
some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. '4 2
Unlike polygamy, the arbitral act cannot be found to subvert public
policy. In fact, public policies lend support to arguments for arbitral im-
munity for clerics: first, the Supreme Court has stated a preference that
decisions made by church hierarchies be upheld;" second, the Court has
taken a position favoring the arbitration of disputes."
Furthermore, the Baumgartner court determined that the relig-
iously-based conduct was not against the public order. The court decided
that it could not assess liability against a faith healer, finding that the
case against the faith healer was "distinguishable from ... Reynolds be-
cause ... [n]o such overt, immoral activity is involved in this case."4 The
court made this determination even though the plaintiff had alleged that
the faith healer persuaded the decedent that the faith healer was curing
him, had advised the decedent not to call a doctor, and had coerced him
into not calling a doctor.46
3. Infringement Without State Need
While the state may not regulate religious conduct as a threat to
public order, it may defend its interference only by demonstrating that
" Id. at 166.
40 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
41 See id. at 167-8.
42 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
43 See supra text accompanying notes 6-12.
4" See infra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
45 Baumgartner, 141 Ill. App. 2d at 906, 490 N.E.2d at 1325.
" Id. at 901-02, 490 N.E.2d at 1321-22.
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the interference is slight or is justified by a compelling state need. In
Sherbert v. Verner,'7 the Supreme Court invalidated a decision which de-
nied unemployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist who refused to
accept a job requiring her to work on Saturdays:
Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work consti-
tutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach
of state legislation. If, therefore, the decision of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be
either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringe-
ment by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because
any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be
justified by a "compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within
the State's constitutional power to regulate."'48
The requirement that the state present a "compelling interest" is
phrased even more strongly in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette.4 9 There, the Supreme Court wrote: "[freedom] of worship [is] sus-
ceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to in-
terests which the state may lawfully protect."5
Apparently, then, even an important state interest must be weighed
against first amendment rights. A state's interest, "however highly we
rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.""
In fact, should courts hold clergy liable, the burden on free exercise
will be far from incidental. Clearly, judicial inquiries into why clergy arbi-
trators decided as they did and about whether their decisions involved
fraud would impinge to some degree on the free exercise rights of those
clerics. Furthermore, the queries would be likely to chill the willingness of
clerics to act as arbitrators, as well as efforts made to encourage their
churches to develop ADR programs.
Given that some infringement of first amendment rights will result if
courts attempt to impose liability on clerical arbitrators, a compelling
state interest must be put forth to justify this interference. In fact, in this
' 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
" Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP V. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) ("in order for Wisconsin to [successfully defend its law requiring
formal education through age 16], it must appear either that the State does not deny the
free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of suffi-
cient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise
Clause").
'9 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
10 Id. at 639.
" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (only compelling state interest
can justify "incidental burden on the free exercise of . . . religion").
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setting, no compelling state interest will warrant the liability. While the
state does have a valid concern with preventing fraudulent or corrupt ar-
bitral awards, the interest is not of a magnitude to justify the interference
suggested. First, courts have available a less intrusive means of redressing
fraudulent awards, since they may invalidate the award itself.52 Moreover,
the state's interest standing alone would not necessarily compel the court
to intervene;5" indeed, courts have a countervailing general policy that
they will enforce contractual agreements, including contractual agree-
ments to arbitrate. Additionally, given the general judicial policy favoring
arbitration, it would be a blatant interference with free exercise to reverse
the presumption only in the religious context.
Courts may not excuse the imposition of liability on church arbitra-
tors by arguing that they perceive a pressing state need to prevent the
erection of a parallel ecclesiastical court system. First, the importance of
the judicial system will not in itself justify impingements of religious free-
dom: "freedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much.
That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the
right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.""'
Secondly, imposing liability under such a rationale would discriminate
against religious arbitrators as opposed to non-religious arbitrators, and
against religious contracts as opposed to secular ones. As a result, the
courts would be placed in the position of violating the establishment
clause.5" Finally, even if regulation could be rationalized as a protection
for the judicial system, the rationalization would at most validate a
court's refusal to enforce a religious arbitrator's judgments; it would not
imply that the court could impose liability on the arbitrators.
4. The Least Intrusive Means Requirement
In order for courts or other governmental bodies to justify the imposition
of regulations on religious conduct, they must demonstrate that the cho-
sen regulation is the least intrusive means by which to achieve the state's
goal: "it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate
that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without
infringing first amendment rights."" The state has a heavy burden in
such a situation since "only those interests of the highest order and those
" See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 236 (schooling requirements deemed unconstitutional as ap-
plied to Amish).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
" Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) ("If the purpose or effect of a law is to
impede the observance of one or all religions . . . that law is constitutionally invalid even
though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect").
" Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
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not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exer-
cise of religion.""7
In the church arbitration context, the "least intrusive means" test
translates into a judicial determination to invalidate the church arbitra-
tor's decision, rather than to declare the arbitrator personally liable for
the mistakes made. Invalidating a judgment will certainly undermine the
effectiveness of the ecclesiastical court system, but personal liability is
calculated to chill the enthusiasm and determination of the arbitrators
and church leaders, without whom the system itself cannot be main-
tained. The Seventh Circuit, in Tamari v. Conrad,58 noted the highly in-
trusive effects brought about when courts hold arbitrators liable.5 9 Ob-
serving that arbitrators generally serve with nominal pay, a circumstance
almost certain to be true in the case of arbitrators connected with
churches, the court stated that arbitrators "cannot be expected to volun-
teer to arbitrate disputes if they can be caught up in the struggle between
the litigants and saddled with the burdens of defending a lawsuit."'
PART Two: TRADITIONAL ARBITRAL LIABILITY IN THE CONMTEXT OF
CHURCH-SPONSORED DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
Arbitrators in the United States have traditionally been cloaked with
a fairly extensive immunity. 1 Courts granted the immunity after compar-
ing the functions of the arbitrator to those of the judge, who had long
been held immune from suit. Section A will demonstrate the rationales
under which courts extended the immunity doctrine to arbitrators in the
church-sponsored arbitration area. Section B will explain some of the
characteristics of immunity in the arbitral area, and will suggest applica-
tions of those factors to clerics arbitrating disputes. However, arbitral im-
munity has been breached in ways that judicial immunity has not. Sec-
tion C will discuss the significance, including the constitutional
implications , of these limitations in the church arbitration field. In a few
cases, even established immunity has been overcome where plaintiffs have
alleged that fraudulent or corrupt arbitration took place. This Article will
suggest that this hole in the immunity cloak must be mended with first
amendment doctrines where clerical arbitrators are being sued.
"" Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
5 552 F.2d 778 (7th Cir. 1977).
11 Id. at 780-81.
40 Id. at 781.
Arbitral liability doctrine originally stemmed from the common law. See International
Union, UAW v. Greyhound Lines, 701 F.2d 1181,1187 (6th Cir. 1983) ("ERISA was not
intended to abrogate this common law [arbitral] immunity") (emphasis supplied).
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A. The Origin of the Arbitral Immunity Doctrine
Judges have long been held above suit for misdeed done in the course
of executing their office. Courts have justified this immunity on the
grounds that it preserves the integrity and impartiality of the judicial of-
fice. For similar reasons, the immunity has been extended to arbitrators
carrying out their arbitral functions. The explanations courts have given
for extending the immunity to lay arbitrators likewise justify a grant of
immunity to clerical arbitrators.
1. Judicial Immunity
The doctrine of judicial immunity protects judges from civil liability
"for acts done by them in the exercise of their judicial functions." 2 Un-
less a judge acts in "clear absence of all jurisdiction," this immunity is
absolute. 3 Judges have absolute civil immunity even for acts done mali-
ciously.64 The Supreme Court explained the rationale for this broad grant
of immunity in Pierson v. Ray."' Courts narrowly interpret this exception,
rendering judges immune for virtually any action. Courts defend this
grant of immunity by pointing to the significance of the judge's position
within the community, and the special need inherent in his or her post:
It is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction that are
brought before him, including controversial cases that arouse the most in-
tense feelings in the litigants. His errors may be corrected on appeal, but he
should not have to fear that unsatisfied litigants may hound him with litiga-
tion charging malice or corruption. Imposing such a burden on judges would
contribute not to principled and fearless decision-making but to
intimidation.6
2. Arbitral Immunity
Courts have extended the "judicial immunity doctrine" to protect ar-
bitrators." Because arbitrators act in a judicial capacity, the rationale be-
" Bradly v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 347 (1871).
" See id. at 352. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (judge not in
clear absence of jurisdiction in approving a mother's petition to sterilize her retarded daugh-
ter though no statute authorized the judge to approve such a petition and no procedure
existed for appealing judge's order); Bradley 80 U.S. at 351 (judge not in clear absence of
jurisdiction where he maliciously disbarred an attorney).
", See Stump, 435 U.S. at 363.
65 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
" Id. at 554.
67 See, e.g., Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 748, 6 N.W. 140 (Iowa 1880); Wasyl Inc. v. First Boston
Corp., 813 F.2d 1579, 1582 (9th Cir. 1987) ("case law dictates that arbitrators are immune
from civil liability for acts within their jurisdiction arising out of their arbitral functions in
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hind judicial immunity supports this extension."8 Arbitrators must be free
to make their judgments on the merits of the matter before them6 9 and be
uninfluenced by any fear of consequences for their acts."
Another argument in favor of arbitral immunity is that parties suing
arbitrators often are attempting to substitute the arbitrator for the party
against whom they actually have a dispute. Instead of suing the arbitra-
tor, courts have suggested that "[an aggrieved party ... should pursue
remedies against the 'real' adversary through the appeal process."7
The broad immunity permitted protects only the arbitrator, and does
not prevent a court from invalidating the award rendered: "[a]rbitration
awards .. .may be impeached because of '(1) fraud, (2) misconduct, (3)
lack of due process in the conduct of a hearing, (4) violation of public
policy, (5) lack of jurisdiction, and (6) want of entirety.' ,7 This alterna-
tive mitigates the harshness of the immunity doctrine for aggrieved arbi-
tration parties.
3. Arbitral Immunity in the Setting of Church-Sponsored Arbitration
a. The Functional Necessity of the Protections
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Butz v. Economou,3
contractually agreed upon arbitration hearings"); Cahn v. International Ladies Garment
Union, 311 F.2d 113, 114-15 (3d Cir. 1962).
Some critics maintain that immunity should never have been extended to the arbitral
context. See, e.g., Becker, The Liability of Arbitrators: The United States, 8 INT'L Bus.
LAw. 341 (1980). Becker's article challenges the traditional theory:
The question must be asked whether the law should expose this arbitrator to the risk
of liability for malicious tort in the belief that the risk will of itself inhibit miscon-
duct. It is no answer that arbitration is consensual; the parties have not agreed to be
abused. I suggest that the time may not be distant when courts in the United States
will ask this question seriously and that some will answer it affirmatively.
Id. at 343.
8 See also Cahn, 311 F.2d at 113 (appellee functioning as arbitrator was performing quasi-
judicial duties and therefore was "clothed" with immunity); Hoosac Tunnel Dock & Eleva-
tor Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 426 (1884). One court indicated that ("an arbitrator is a
quasi judicial officer under our laws exercising judicial functions") arbitrators are "quasi-
judicial officer[s]," and that "there is as much reason in [the arbitrator's case] for protecting
and insuring his impartiality, independence, and freedom from undue influences, as in the
case of a judge or juror."; See, e.g., Jones 54 Iowa at 751, 6 N.W. at 142 (noting that arbitra-
tors perform same functions as courts in adjudicating questions of law and fact and deter-
mining rights); Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 325 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
" See Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 117 (9th Cir. 1962).
70 Id.
71 Corey v. New York Stock Exchange, 691 F.2d 1205, 1211 (6th Cir. 1982).
71 Morales v. Vega, 483 F.Supp. 1057, 1063 (D.P.R. 1979) (citing Labor Relations Board v.
Cooperativa Cafeteros, 89 P.R.R. 487, 490 (1963)).
" 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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church-sponsored arbitrators deserve the same arbitral immunity as their
secular counterparts. When applying Butz's "functional comparibility"
test to church sponsored arbitrators, the relevant consideration concerns
the functional comparability of the cleric's judgment with that of a
judge . 7  By adjudicating disputes between consenting members of their
churches, clerics certainly perform a judicial-like function.
The Sixth Circuit, in Corey v. New York Stock Exchange7 5 indicated
that the Supreme Court's rationale rested on the arbitrator (1) needing
protection from fear causing bias (2) in performing official functions (3)
within his or her jurisdiction.7 Corey's three tenets all would apply in the
church-sponsored arbitration context. Clearly, clerical arbitrators need as
much protection from fear-causing bias as do other arbitrators. Failure to
provide this protection would frustrate the policy behind arbitral immu-
nity.77 Furthermore, the first amendment's free exercise clause would re-
quire a compelling state interest to hold religious arbitrators liable while
excusing non-religious arbitrators.7 8 Clerical arbitrators will meet Corey's
second plank, i.e., will be acting in their official function, if they are reli-
gious officials and feel a religious calling to perform arbitration. Finally,
clerics will be performing arbitration within their jurisdiction-the third
requirement-whenever the parties have agreed to allow the cleric to ar-
bitrate between them. Clerics will be so empowered whenever they are
dealing with members of their church,79 or with parties who have contrac-
tually agreed to allow them to perform this particular arbitration.80
b. Arbitration as a Favored Dispute Resolution Process
In general, courts favor the use of arbitration as a means of dispute
resolution: "[t]he arbitration of controversies, it has been repeatedly
stated in the decisions and evidenced in both state and federal statutes, is
See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1205. In interpreting Butz, the Sixth Circuit held that "the rele-
vant consideration in evaluating whether immunity should attach to the acts of persons in
certain roles and with certain responsibilities was the 'functional comparability' of their
judgments to those of a judge." Id. at 1209.
75 691 F.2d 1205 (6th Cir. 1982).
71 Id. at 1209. Not every court has allowed the plaintiff to abrogate immunity by charging
that the arbitrator was without jurisdiction. Id. For documentation of the differing views,
see infra notes and accompanying text.
77 See supra note 67.
" See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 23. The power arises because church members contract to accept church
discipline. Id.
80 See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1209. "The submission of the parties replaces a statute or court
order as the source of the arbitrator's power with regard to subject matter and procedural
rules .... Jurisdiction by consent is recognized by reviewing and enforcing courts." Id.
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favored in law." 81 The policy in favor of arbitration is directly linked to
the policy favoring arbitral immunity, and several courts have argued
that the link should become more explicit as approval of arbitration
grows: "[i]f national policy encourages arbitration and if arbitrators are
indispensable agencies in the furtherance of that policy, then it follows
that the common law rule protecting arbitrators from suit ought not only
to be affirmed, but, if need be, expanded." 2 In fact, the policy in favor of
arbitral immunity is quite strong; one court has even declared that it
could not find that Congress "intended to abolish arbitral immunity in
the absence of Congress having specifically so provided such [sic] an abro-
gation in the legislative record.""'
In the church-sponsored arbitration context, the full array of benefits
produced by arbitration -will continue to justify arbitral immunity.8 ' In
addition, proponents of alternative dispute resolution have suggested that
a religious influence can offer certain benefits to arbitration. 5 While crit-
ics may argue that the courts have a special right to prevent the forma-
tion of a separate religious judicial system, the courts have no such right
while they acknowledge the first amendment, while they continue to favor
arbitration in secular dispute contexts, and while they honor the right of
churches to control their own disputes.
c. The "Adequate Safeguards" Rationale
In holding that arbitrators may not be sued for the functions they
perform, courts have reasoned that liability is unnecessary since arbitra-
tion processes provide adequate safeguards to protect the parties in-
volved. For example, the Corey court listed a number of protective de-
vices available, including: (1) that arbitrations are like judicial
proceedings because they have or offer - (a) adversary-like proceedings,
(b) an opportunity to be heard, (c) discovery, (d) hearings, (e) an oppor-
tunity to present witnesses, (f) an opportunity to cross-examine other
party's witnesses, (g) a written opinion; (2) that the parties preserve an
" Corbin v. Washington Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 393, 396 (D.S.C.), aft'd, 398
F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968).
8' Hill v. Aro Corp., 263 F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
8' International Union v. Greyhound Lines, 701 F.2d 1181, 1187 (6th Cir. 1983) (ERISA
case).
84 See S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, DIsPuTE RESOLUTrIoN 189-90 (1985). Advantages
often attributed to arbitration include: (1) "expertise of the decisionmaker;" (2) "finality of
the decision;" (3) "privacy of the proceedings;" (4) "procedural informality;" (5) "low cost;"
(6) "speed." Id.
8 See McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660, 1665-67 (1985).
McThenia and Shaffer suggest that the Christian and Hebraic traditions of arbitration,
which emphasizes reconciliation and love, offer some improvements to modern secular arbi-
tration and traditional judicial resolution. Id.
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automatic right of judicial review pursuant to the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. Sec. 1 et seq.; and (3) the fact that arbitration is volun-
tary. 6 Further, the Corey court noted: [t]he extension of immunity to
arbitrators where arbitration is pursuant to a private agreement between
the parties is especially compelling because arbitration is the means se-
lected by the parties themselves for disposing of controversies between
them." 7
Critics charge that the courts have made an overly optimistic assess-
ment of what takes place in arbitration. They argue that in reality arbi-
tration presents few safeguards:
In the United States there is little insulation of the arbitrator from external
influence: he is not bound by precedent; written transcripts of arbiral pro-
ceedings are extraordinary; he need not make known the reasons for his
decision; and the grounds of appeal from his decisions are limited to such
matters as corruption, partiality, procedural misconduct (e.g., refusing to
hear evidence), and misuse of power.8
Valid or not, this rationale may not help justify arbitral immunity in the
religious context. Religious arbitrators may be untrained in legal or arbi-
tral methods and consequently unfamiliar with traditional rules of proce-
dure and evidence. Conceivably, the cleric may even refuse to use tradi-
tional legal methods on religious grounds. For example, a cleric might
determine to use private prayer conferences rather than confrontational
dialogues or cross-examination. 8
These criticisms may indicate that this rationale is weaker than the
others used to justify arbitral immunity. However, by requiring certain
procedural safeguards, courts will be limiting the flexibility of arbitration,
thus negating one of the major advantages of alternative dispute resolu-
tion systems." Moreover, courts will find it difficult to demonstrate that
8 See Corey, 691 F.2d at 1210.
Id. at 1211; see also Morales v. Vega, 483 F. Supp. 1057, 1061-62 (D. P.R. 1979) (arbitra-
tions protect disputants' rights because (1) they are adversarial; (2) the arbitrators "hold
hearings, administer oaths, subpoena witnesses, issue summonses and require ... evidence";
(3) the disobedience of a subpoena is punishable by contempt; (4) the arbitrator has to put
the decision in writing (by statute)); cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-14 (1978) (in
awarding immunity to agency adjudicators, the Supreme Court noted safeguards available
to parties appearing before the agency's tribunal); Corbin v. Washington Fire & Marine Ins.
Co., 278 F. Supp. 393, 396 (D.S.C.) (arbitration must allow the presentation of evidence and
must recognize the right of the parties to be present, "though [it is] not bound strictly in its
reception to the rules of evidence") aff'd, 398 F.2d 543 (4th Cir. 1968).
88 Becker, The Liability of Arbitrators: The United States, 8 INT'L. Bus. LAW. 341, 343
(1980).
" Not every religious arbitration will suffer procedural shortcomings; however, it seems
probable that more religious than secular arbitrations will present such problems.
90 See Levine v. Wiss & Co., 97 N.J. 242, 257, 478 A.2d 397, 405 (1984) (O'Hern, J., dissent-
ing) (parties should be free to agree to procedures or to discard them).
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any specific procedure is a compelling state interest which may justify a
restriction on the Free Exercise rights of clerical arbitrators.91
d. Applications of the Doctrines Allowing Plaintiffs to Defeat
Arbitral Immunity in Other Contexts
If a plaintiff establishes, or, depending on the burden of proof rule,
an arbitrator fails to establish, any one of four factual claims, he may
abrogate the application of arbitral immunity. In order for immunity to
apply, then, the person claiming immunity must have been acting in an
arbitral capacity, must have had authority to act as an arbitrator for this
particular case, must have been acting within a proper jurisdictional
sphere, and, perhaps, must actually have reached a decision or have
presented a reasonable excuse for failing to reach a decision. First amend-
ment considerations complicate each of these factual scenarios in church-
based arbitration, and this section will suggest that the courts may not
examine the first three factors without delving into church doctrine and
power division issues, and that they may not research the fourth fact situ-
ation where the cleric claims that the failure to decide was based on reli-
gious beliefs.
1. The False Arbitrator
Where the person claiming immunity was not actually acting in an
arbitral capacity, no immunity will be granted.92
To the extent that courts reject clergy malpractice theories, little will
turn on whether or not the clerics were acting as arbitrators, since they
will likely be immune from suit under any circumstances. But, should
clergy malpractice become an accepted theory, the question of whether
clerics may veil themselves in arbitral immunity will become significant.
Two problems will confront courts attempting to answer the question
91 See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
92 See, e.g., Horsell Graphics Ind. v. Valuation Counselors, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1117 (N.D. Ill.
1986). The Horsell court which drew a fine line between an appraiser and an arbitrator:
[An arbitration] . . . presupposes a controversy or a difference to be tried and de-
cided.... On the other hand, an appraisal is the proper term to be used when an
appraisement or valuation is to be made-as auxiliary or incident to a contract....
[Aippraisers are generally expected to act on their own knowledge and investigation
and hence are not required to give notice of the hearings, hear evidence or receive the
statements of the parties.
Id. at 1119-20 (Quoting Sebree v. Board of Education, 254 Ill. 438, 446, 98 N.E. 931, 935
(1912)). Another court concluded that an appraisal firm, hired to ascertain the value of a
company, was not entitled to any sort of immunity even where it had "receive[d] informa-
tion" from a party. Sebree, 254 Ill. at 454, 98 N.E. at 1112; cf. Lundgren v. Freeman, 307
F.2d 104, 117 (9th Cir. 1962). (an architect acts as an arbitrator "when ... resolv[ing] dis-
putes between owner and contractor," and will be immune when acting in that capacity).
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of whether a particular cleric acted as an arbitrator in a given set of cir-
cumstances. First, church-based arbitration may not avail itself of the
traditional judicial forms, and so courts may have trouble identifying
processes as arbitration. Second, a court may be required to investigate
doctrinal mandates and beliefs in order to accurately ascertain whether a
certain cleric was acting as an arbitrator. 3 Such an inquiry would embroil
the court in a forbidden investigation into first amendment issues.
2. The Lack of Arbitral Authority
Courts differ as to whether plaintiffs may invoke judicial inquiry
where they assert that the arbitrator lacked the authority to be an arbi-
trator of a particular case. A federal district court in Massachussetts sug-
gested that it would examine such a question, noting in dictum that:
"[t]he thrust of plaintiffs' arguments is that the Secretary lacks the statu-
tory authority to set himself up as an arbitrator in the first place. To say
that plaintiffs cannot present this argument because the Secretary is an
arbitrator avoids the real question the case poses.""4
However, the court in Tamari v. Conrad" reached the opposite con-
clusion. In that case, Tamari claimed that the arbitral board was illegally
constituted in violation of the parties' agreement to arbitrate and the rel-
evant rules of the Chicago Board of Trade.9 The court held that "arbitral
immunity should be extended to cases where the authority of an arbitra-
tor to resolve a dispute is challenged, ' 97 even though the court acknowl-
edged that the rationale of freeing arbitators from fear of reprisal98 is "in-
applicable" in such cases. 99
Admittedly this doctrine could pose difficulties in the clerical arbitra-
tion area, especially where the church performed the arbitration merely
on the basis of church membership. In such a situation, the losing party
may argue that the articles of church membership contained no promise
" For example, an elder who attended an arbitration session and consulted with the pastor
before the pastor reached a decision might claim he acted as an arbitrator. The losing party
might urge that the elder was not an arbitrator because church dogma closely confined the
rights and duties of an elder.
9 Greenfield and Montague Transportation v. Donovan, No. 83-0467-F, slip op. (D. Ma.
June 25, 1984) (case dismissed because Secretary's action was committed to agency discre-
tion and thus nonreviewable).
95 552 F.2d 778, (7th Cir. 1977); see also Krecun v. Bakery Workers Union, 586 F. Supp.
545, 550 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (following holding in Tamari).
" Id. at 780.
97 Id.
" For examples of cases relying on the "fear of reprisal" rationale, see Hill v. Aro Corp., 263
F. Supp. 324, 326 (N.D. Ohio 1967), and Cahn v. Internatinal Ladies Garment Union, 203 F.
Supp. 191, 194 (E.D. Pa.), afi'd, 311 F.2d 113 (3rd Cir. 1962).
11 99. Tamari, 552 F.2d at 780.
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to submit to arbitration. Even where the parties have reached a specific
agreement to arbitrate, the losing party may claim that he or she was
coerced into accepting the arbitration, a coercion aggravated by the fact
that the perpetrators represented a religious group. 100
At the same time, the question of authority clearly will implicate the
first amendment. First, the court will not be able to interpret the articles
of membership for an aggrieved plaintiff.'0 ' Second, investigating whether
a pastor coerced a church member into accepting arbitration will necessa-
rily involve the court in a proscribed review of the religious beliefs which
prompted the pastor's involvement.0 2 Furthermore, courts should not
burden pastors with the difficult task of self-regulation in their requests
of parishioners to accept arbitration; the first amendment guards against
the chilling effect caused by self-regulation. Finally, courts should avoid
clergy liability since they have available the less intrusive option of invali-
dating the judgment. 10 3
3. Actions Outside A Proper Jurisdictional Sphere
Courts have split on whether they will allow plaintiffs to defeat an
assertion of immunity by demonstrating that the arbitrators were acting
outside their proper jurisdictional arena when they made their decision. A
federal judge in Ohio refused to grant an arbitral appeal committee's mo-
tion to dismiss the complaint against it." According to the judge, the
Ohio Joint State Committee's "jurisdiction arises from the inability to
settle a dispute on the local level."' 05 Thus, where no local dispute had
ever arisen, the Committee could not have obtained jurisdiction.' On
the other hand, arguing that the Supreme Court had granted judges im-
munity unless they act in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the
00 Clearly churches might safeguard themselves, to some degree, by refusing to arbitrate
merely on the basis of membership, insisting instead that the parties sign a separate agree-
ment authorizing arbitration of the particular dispute. In this article, however, I assume,
that church-based arbitration programs will make mistakes and ask what will then happen.
Moreover, some churches may argue that dispute resolution mechanisms allow them to
maintain a particular identity as a church which is important to them. Consequently, they
may perform arbitration with or without the consent of the parties, and use excommunica-
tion as an enforcement procedure. In such a case, a party might sue a local pastor, or
church, or both.
"' See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
102 See supra text accompanying notes 30-36.
'0' See supra text accompanying notes 56-60.
104 See Warner v. McLean Trucking Co., 574 F. Supp. 291, 299 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Ohio Joint
State Committee promulgated guidelines for a flexible work week in absence of a particular
dispute).
100 Id.
106 Id.
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subject-matter,' 10 7 a federal district court in Pennsylvania found that ar-
bitrators acting without jurisdiction had "absolute immunity" from a Sec-
tion 1983 claim.'08
Church-based arbitrators probably will be acting outside their juris-
diction if they attempt to resolve conflicts in which at least one party is
not a member of the cleric's church and has not agreed to submit to the
arbitration. Beyond this relatively uncontroversial proposition lies the
more problematic issues of defining a "member" of a church and of decid-
ing who gets to compose that definition. On constitutional grounds, courts
refuse to examine or ratify church membership rosters.0 9 As a result,
courts will probably adopt some variation of the "clear absence of juris-
diction" rule at which the Pennsylvania court hinted, allowing them to
circumvent any inspection of church membership policies while prevent-
ing egregious abuses of jurisdiction.
4. Failure to Arbitrate
In E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan Construction Co. of Texas,1'0 the
Fifth Circuit denied immunity to an arbitrator for failing to decide a case
without an adequate excuse."' Arguing that an arbitrator "should be im-
mune from liability only to the extent that his action is functionally
judge-like" the court determined: "where [an arbitrator's] action, or inac-
tion, can fairly be characterized as delay or failure to decide rather than
timely decisionmaking (good or bad), he loses his claim to immunity be-
cause he loses his resemblance to a judge. He has simply defaulted on a
contractual duty to both parties.""' 2
The rationale offered in Ernst hardly supports the conclusion, since
judges may be granted immunity even where they, without excuse, fail to
decide a case." s In Baar v. Tigerman, 11 a California appellate court
reached the same conclusion as in Ernst, but with a more forthright ex-
planation for its result. Acknowledging that a judge would not be held
liable for the same offense, the court differentiated the judicial office on
..7 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 335, 351 (1871).
108 See Raitport v. Provident National Bank, 451 F. Supp. 522, 527 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (case
with claims amounting to more than $10,000 was mistakenly referred to arbitration under
court rules mandating arbitration for suits involving less than $10,000).
... See, e.g., United States v. Church of World Peace, 775 F.2d 265, 266-67 (10th Cir. 1985)
(setting aside order for membership list on first amendment grounds).
'1 551 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 (1978).
.,. See id. (arbitrator-architect not immune because of the "tentative, inconguous, and
often contradictory nature" of his conduct in failing to decide case).
..2 Id. at 1033.
"' See, e.g., Wyatt v. Arnot, 7 Cal. App. 221, 94 P. 86 (Cal. Ct. App. 1907) (no cause of
action available against judge for intentional failure to decide case).
114 140 Cal. App. 3d 979, 189 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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several grounds: (1) "a judge receives power from the Constitution and
the people and judicial action has far-reaching and precedent setting con-
sequences"; (2) judicial actions are "public in nature"; (3) judges are
bound to "follow the law"; and (4) judges may determine rights and obli-
gations of those not parties to the action, or decide issues not suggested
by the parties." 5
In the context of religious arbitration, this perplexing problem is
most likely to arise when an arbitrator presents a religious rationale for
the failure to decide. For example, the cleric might claim that he or she
was waiting for an inflow of the Holy Spirit in order to ensure that the
decision was correct, or that God, the Holy Spirit, or some other Supreme
Being told him or her not to render a decision at that time. However,
since Baar and Ernst pointed explicitly to the fact that the arbitrators in
those cases presented no excuse at all for their failure to decide, courts
could treat the cleric's claims as a satisfactory excuse instead of an unex-
plained refusal to reach a conclusion. Because courts cannot examine the
truth or falsehood of beliefs, courts will have to limit their investigation
of the excuse to whether or not the cleric believed he or she had received
such a message.11 Where clerics present no religious excuse, however,
courts should probably treat the case in whatever way they ultimately
determine to treat other failures to arbitrate.
5. Bad Faith, Fraud, or Corruption
In some jurisdictions courts have permitted allegations of fraud, bad
faith and corruption to challenge an otherwise valid claim to arbitral im-
munity: "[P]laintiff has alleged that the award is the result of partiality
and misconduct which, if true, would vitiate the cloak of immunity which
surrounds the activities of an arbitrator. Such allegations are sufficient to
enable plaintiff's complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss." ' Other
cases have permitted arbitrators to obtain immunity even where allega-
tions of fraud or corruption were made.1 8
"' Id. at 984, 189 Cal. Reptr. at 837-38.
"' See supra text accompanying note 35.
'17 I & F Corp. v. International Ass'n of Heat and Frost, 493 F. Supp. 147, 152 (S.D. Ohio
1980). Another court suggested that it might hold an architect liable for acting "fraudu-
lently, or with wilful and malicious intent to injure." Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104,
118 (9th Cir. 1962). In Lundgren, the court noted that the fact that an architect is paid by
one party (the owner), and called to pass judgment on his own plans creates "strong pres-.
sures pushing him in the direction to being unfair." Id. As a result, he or she was different
from "the ordinary impartial arbitrator." Id.
"' See, e.g., Babylon Milk & Cream Co. v. Horvitz, 4 App. Div. 2d 777, 165 N.Y.S.2d 717
(2d Dep't 1957) (arbitrator immune from liability for charges that he conspired to render a
fraudulent award); see also Jones v. Brown, 54 Iowa 74, 6 N.W. 140 (1880) (immunity even
in face of allegations that arbitrator rendered award fraudulently and corruptly); Hoosac
ARBITRATOR LIABILITY
In establishing rules in the religious arbitration context, courts face
their most difficult task in determining how to deal with plaintiffs' allega-
tions of arbitral fraud and misconduct. On the one hand, no court wants
to protect arbitrators who perpetrate fraudulent and corrupt acts. At the
same time, however, the general common law rule militates against liabil-
ity. Moreover, clerical arbitrators will not face particularly strong pres-
sures to produce unfair results since they presumably are not paid by
only one of the two parties."19
Essentially, the aim of granting immunity is to protect even those
undeserving of the protection on the assumption that protecting everyone
in the designated group will ultimately achieve the greatest measure of
justice. 120 In the face of first amendment arguments favoring the protec-
tion of clerics, courts should lean in the direction of avoiding liability. 2'
Additionally, courts may actually be unable to examine charges of fraud
and corruption where to do so would require an inquiry into religious
standards or religious beliefs the arbitrator used in making a decision.1
2
CONCLUSION
As arbitration within religious institutions increases, courts will be
faced with very tough questions about arbitral liability. The answers will
require a delicate balance of general public policy favoring arbitration,
first amendment constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion, and
Tunnel Dock and Elevator Co. v. O'Brien, 137 Mass. 424, 426 (1884) (same immunity as
judge).
"I See supra text accompanying notes 29-32. Admittedly religious leaders on a church's
payroll may face a greater conflict of interests if they atempt to resolve disputes between an
individual and the church.
'2' Justice Hand phrased this proposition aptly:
It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his
powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected
with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and,
if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be
monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to
know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to
submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to
the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most
resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. . . . In
this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs
done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the con-
stant dread of retaliation.
Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
... See generally supra Section One.
,22 See supra text accompanying notes 31-35. The spectre of an enforced judicial foray into
religious doctrine differentiates the cleric's fraudulent arbitration from his/her intentional
tort, for which clerics are held liable.
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the need to protect the public from the fraudulent arbitrations.
In reaching the optimal compromise, courts will probably turn to
general arbitral liability principles. In most cases these rules will protect
the clerical arbitrators; where the principles are weak or uncertain, this
paper has maintained that the rules must be buttressed by first amend-
ment considerations.
To a certain extent preserving the immunity of arbitrators endangers
the state's ability to protect the victim of a fraudulent arbitration. Yet
even Professor Fiss, one of the strongest critics of ADR, acknowledges its
use in the religious setting: "I am sure that there is much force to the plea
for reconciliation when it is addressed to the insular religious communi-
ties that still dot the American landscape." '23 Furthermore, while dangers
inhere in any immunity scheme, in the religious arbitration area the first
amendment places the risks within the class our country has chosen to
assume.
,' Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1671 (1985).
